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Summary. In his 2009 PSA Recent Ph.D. Award winning contribution to the bi-annual
PSA Conference at Pittsburgh in 2008, C. Wu¨thrich mounted an argument against struc-
turalism about space-time in the context of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), to
the effect that structuralists cannot discern space-time points. An “abysmal embarrass-
ment” for the structuralist, Wu¨thrich judged. Wu¨thrich’s characterisation of space-time
structuralism is however incorrect. We demonstrate how, on the basis of a correct char-
acterisation of space-time structuralism, it is possible to discern space-time points in the
GTR-structures under consideration. Thus Wu¨thrich’s argument crumbles.
1. Introduction and Overview. At the end of his magisterial monograph on the
modern debate about the nature of space-time between substantivalism and relationism
World Enough and Space-Time (1989: 208), J. Earman hinted at a third view overcom-
ing the difficulties of both views. Lately space-time structuralism — or synonymously
ontic structural realism about space-time — has been propounded or addressed by a num-
ber of authors as this third view.2 C. Wu¨thrich (2010), ironically an ex-PhD student of
Earman, will have nothing of it, because structuralism has an “abysmally embarrassing”
consequence. This consequence arises when we consider cosmological models generated
by the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), i.e. space-times that have a unique foliation
into homogeneous and isotropic 3-dimensional spaces of constant curvature; the conse-
quence of structuralism about such ‘standard cosmic space-times’ is that everyone of these
3-dimensional spaces contains no more than a single space-time point. This contradicts
1Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 51, H5-10, 3062 PA Rotterdam;
and Department of Physics & Astronomy, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG, WG-3.11, 3584 CD
Utrecht, The Netherlands, Europe; f.a.muller@uu.nl .
2See references in Wu¨thrich (2010) for recent papers on structuralism about space-time.
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the mathematical fact that such a 3-dimensional space has a non-denumerable infinitude
of points.
We are going to meet this challenge head-on and out of the clash emerges a formulation
of space-time structuralism that arguably fulfils Earman’s hope expressed about  years
ago. At the heart of Wu¨thrich’s challenge lies the issue how to discern space-time points
in symmetric space-times, where the points arguably share all their physico-geometrical
properties. Then it seems that such space-time points are genuinely indiscernible as
far as the physics goes (GTR), and what discerns them from each other is some meta-
physical property, haecceittas or primitive thisness, that transcends physics. They seem
qualitatively the same yet quantitatively distinct. When structuralists reject such overtly
metaphysical and physics-transcending properties by adhering to Leibniz’s Principle of
the Identity of qualitative Indiscernibles (PIdIn), they seem committed, indeed, to the
conclusion that every 3-dimensional space in a standard cosmic space-time contains a
single space-time point. The way we are going to meet Wu¨thrich’s challenge is by indi-
cating how space-time points in such spaces, and in fact in every GTR-structure, can be
discerned, on the basis of only the metric tensor after all. Thus emerges a correct version
of space-time structuralism, that can and will be characterised sharply in four sonorous
principles.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the general-relativistic stage. In
Section 3, we present Wu¨thrich’s incorrect version of structuralism about space-time, and
in Section 4, we expound his argument against structuralism and extend this argument
beyond GTR. In Section 5, we provide a correct characterisation of structuralism in four
sonorous principles and sketch, in Section 6, how to discern space-time points generally
on the basis of the lightcone structure of space-time. In Section 7, we briefly address the
charge of vicious circularity.
2. Standard Cosmic Space-Time Structures. We characterise GTR in the canonical
manner, through its structures (also called ‘models’). A GTR-structure G standardly is
set-theoretically defined:
G ≡ 〈M, T (M), C(M), A(M), g, T 〉 , (1)
where base set M is a 4-dimensional Lorentzian geometric differentiable manifold3 (the
set of space-time points), T (M) is a (paracompact, Hausdorff) topological subset-family
of M, C(M) ⊂ T (M) is an open cover of M, A(M) is a maximal atlas (co-ordinate
charts of the covering regions, smoothly fitted together), and g is the metric tensor of
rank 2 on M.4
3For GTR, it is sufficient to consider C2-manifolds, because solutions of Einstein’s field equations need
only be differentiable twice. Lorentzian geometric manifolds come by definition equipped with a metric
tensor g of signature +2.
4Other geometrical objects, like the affine connexion Γ, the Christoffel symbols {∴}, the Ricci tensor,
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Hom(G) is the group of homeomorphisms, which preserve the topological structure
of G, encoded in T (M). Diff(G) is the group of diffeomorphisms, which preserve the
differentiability structure, encoded in the C(M) cum A(M). Sym(G) is the group of
spatio-temporal symmetries, or isometries, which preserve the geometrical structure, en-
coded in g. When we extend Sym(G) with the dilatations, we obtain the conformal group,
also called the causal group, and therefore denoted by Caus(M), because it preserves ‘the
lightcone structure’ and by implication the usual causal relations one can define in M.
Aut(G) is the group of automorphisms, which leave the entire structure G invariant.
These composition-groups of one-one mappings M→M are related as follows:
Aut(G) ⊆ Sym(G) ⊆ Caus(G) ⊆ Diff(G) ⊆ Hom(G) ⊂ Π(M) , (2)
where Π(M) is the set of one-one mappings (permutations) on M. We emphasise that
Sym(G) should not be confused with Sym(GTR), the symmetry group of the theory, which
is the group of all diffeomorphisms between all GTR-structures.
This was the marble; now comes the wood: enter GTR. The final item in structure
G (1) is the energy-momentum tensor T of rank 2, which codifies the distribution of matter,
and is required to be related to g according to Einstein’s field equations. Matter (T )
determines the geometry (g) of space-time, and the geometry of space-time determines
the behaviour of matter: free particles and bodies move along geodesics according to the
geodesic equation (‘the equation of free motion’). If the field equations with a given T
have no solution, there is no ensuing GTR-structure either; if there is a solution (up to
isometry), we have an ensuing GTR-structure; if there are more (non-isometric) solutions,
there are more ensuing GTR-structures.
Finally, when there is no energy-momentum (T = 0), hence no matter, g is the Lorentz-
Minkowski metric (η), and T (M) is some Zeeman topology (Z(M)), we obtain the fixed
space-time structure of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), known as Minkowski
space-time:
M = 〈M, Z(M), η〉 . (3)
The spatial part of η is the Euclidean metric tensor, so that all simultaneity spaces are
the same flat 3-dimensional Euclidean spaces (E3); and Sym(E3) is the familiar Euclidean
group of displacements and rotations. The spatio-temporal symmetry group Sym(M) is
the Poincare´ group. M is also spatio-temporally homogenous, in that group Sym(M) acts
transitively on the whole of M.
Let us now call a GTR-structure G (1) a cosmic space-time structure iff there is an
open interval I ⊂ R and a complete, connected 3-dimensional Riemannian differentiable
etc., are all determined by g and therefore omitted from six-tuple (1) — other elements in the six-tuple
usually are also omitted, such as T (M), C(M) and A(M), but we have put them in for the sake of future
reference. Whether G (1) should be taken to represent ‘the geometry of space-time’, or whether some far
more sparser structure represents it, such as 〈M, g〉, we need not decide now.
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manifold having base set Σ such that M is isomorphic to I ×Σ, and the so-called cosmic
time function f : I → Σ, t 7→ Σt is differentiable (in an appropriate sense, see McCabe
(2004)). For the sake of brevity, we call the 3-dimensional spatial submanifolds into which
cosmic space-time is foliated cosmic spaces. One now speaks of 3+1-dimensional space-
time. Every cosmic space Σt is a ‘snapshot’ of space-timeM at cosmic time t. We take Σ
to be the set of every Σt, so that for every t ∈ I: Σt ∈ Σ . These cosmic spaces Σt ⊂M
inherit their metric tensor h(t) from g on M: g = −c2dt2 + h(t), where c is the speed of
light. Every one of the six independent components of h(t), when expressed in some co-
ordinate chart, can exhibit a different dependence on t ∈ I. Cosmic space-time structures
with such erratic geometrical behavour are however rarely studied in cosmology.
In the special case of maximally symmetric cosmic space-times (having only globally
isotropic and homogeneous cosmic spaces Σt), which have a Friedman-Robertson-Walker
metric, all components of the spatial metric exhibit the same dependence on cosmic time:
h(t) = R2(t)h, where R(t) is the radius of the space Σt at cosmic time t. (If R(t)
increases and Σt contains galaxies, then the distance between them increases because
space expands over cosmic time, not because galaxies are moving away from each other
through fixed space.) To these standard cosmic space-time structures Wu¨thrich’s abysmal
embarrassment argument applies. All cosmic spaces Σt of a standard cosmic space-time
have constant curvature and differ only by a scale factor. Then the Gauss curvature
scalar Kt ∈ R of every cosmic space Σt has the same sign. Theorem (McGabe (2004:
513)): every space Σt of curvature Kt is isometric to either one of the following spaces
(ρ ≡ 1/
√
|Kt|):
[1] K > 0: sphere S3(ρ), embeddable in E4.
[2] K = 0: Euclidean space E3.
[3] K < 0: hyperboloid H3(ρ), embeddable in E3,1.
According to Wu¨thrich’s formulation of the Cosmological Principle (CP), which we
shall call the Universal Cosmological Principle (UCP), in cosmic space-time structures
for modeling the universe, only ‘cosmic’ subsets of M represent properties of space-time
points, where we define subset P ⊆ M to be cosmic iff per cosmic space Σt ∈ Σ , all
points lie in P or none of them lies P :
∀ t ∈ I : Σt ⊆ P ∨ Σt ∩ P = ∅ . (4)
For further discussion about the approximate truth of CP and its role in current cosmology,
we refer to Weinberg (1972: §14.1; 2008: Ch. 1) and McCabe (2004: 594).5
For the sake of convenience, we introduce the following sets of subsets of M:
5Wu¨thrich (2010: formula (1)) uses 2nd-order logic to formulate UCP in terms of monadic predicates,
which he prefers because (i) set-theoretical representation (in 1st-order logic) is problematic when it comes
to different properties having the same set-extension; and (ii) set-theory cannot deal with intensional
properties (private communication by e-mail from C. Wu¨thrich, January 2010). When we do not identify
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Prop(M) : set of subsets of M that represent properties of points in M.6
Cos(M) : set of cosmic subsets of M (4).
Aut(M) : set of automorphic subsets of M (5).
(In full generality, the set-theoretical representation of a property of members of a set S is
a subset of S, which should not be confused with properties being identified with sets (to
make the two identical). Further, if we were to take Prop(M) identical to the power-set
P(M), we would make Prop(M) too encompassing, because there will be lots of subsets
of M that do not represent any genuine properties of space-time points, let alone play a
part in GTR. Mathematical entities without physical significance being there in our domain
of discourse as a consequence of the mathematical background framework (set-theory) we
adopt: familiar and widely accepted. Hence Prop(M) ⊂ P(M). On the other hand, when
we consider every different g to give rise to a different property of a space-time point, the
number of different possible properties is at least that of the cardinality of the continuum
(R). Nonetheless we then still have that Prop(M) ⊂ P(M), because the cardinality of
P(M) is larger than the one of R.) Subset P ⊆ M is automorphic in GTR-structure G
iff P is invariant under every automorphism:
∀ψ ∈ Aut(G) : ψ[P ] = P . (5)
In terms of the sets just introduced, the Universal Cosmological Principle (UCP) reads:
Prop(M) ⊆ Cos(M) . (6)
Without a specification of Prop(M), proposition (6) cannot be decided by means of proof.
One can prove that in cosmic space-times, all automorphic subsets are cosmic (see Muller
(2011)): Aut(M) ⊆ Cos(M).
3. Space-Time Structuralism Incorrectly Characterised. Wu¨thrich (2010: 1045–
1046) characterises space-time structuralism in the context of GTR as the view according
to which the space-time points inM only exemplify intra-structural relational properties.
This is fleshed out more precisely as follows.
First, structuralism should be taken to include that all and only automorphic subsets
represent properties of space-time points:
Prop(M) = Aut(M) . (7)
Secondly, structuralism, as a variety of scientific realism and therefore antagonistic to
bestowing objects with properties that are scientifically otiose, or worse, seem to have no
properties with their set-extensions, but keep talking in terms of sets representing properties, objection
(i) evaporates; and until and unless intensional properties are presented that somehow play a roˆle in
GTR, objection (ii) is toothless. Furthermore, 2nd-order logic on top of set-theory surely is overdone, in
dissonance with the noble spirit of parsimony.
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physical significance whatsoever (notably and notoriously haecceitas and primitive this-
ness), should be taken to include also Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
(PIdIn) with regard to space-time points. Applied to an arbitrary GTR-structure G ∈ G
(1), PIdIn says (Wu¨thrich (2010), formula (2), set-theoretically construed):
∀ p, q ∈M : AbsInd(p, q) −→ p = q , (8)
where absolute indiscernibility is defined as sharing all properties:
AbsInd(p, q,M) iff ∀P ∈ Prop(M) : p ∈ P ←→ q ∈ P . (9)
We call (8) henceforth the Principle of the Identity of Absolute Indiscernibles (PIAI. So
p ∈ M is by definition absolutely discernible in M iff it has a property that no other
q ∈ M has. When we combine (7) and PIAI (8), we obtain the Principle of the Identity
of Automorphic Absolute Indiscernibles (PIAAI):
∀ p, q ∈M : AutAbsInd(p, q,M) −→ p = q , (10)
where AutAbsInd(p, q,M) is like AbsInd(p, q,M) save that the universal quantifier in
definition (9) ranges over Aut(M). PIAAI (10) is what the structuralist is committed to
in addition to (7).
Wu¨thrich (2010: 1046, our emphasis) submits that structuralism must hold that
Prop(M) is “the set of automorphically invariant relations, excluding any intrinsic prop-
erties,” which we take to be partly expressed by (7). Further on, it turns out that by
“relations” Wu¨thrich means: relational properties, the sort of properties of a space-time
point p ∈ M expressed by logical formulae like ‘∀ q : 〈p, q〉 ∈ R’ and ‘∃ q : 〈q, p〉 ∈ R’,
where R ⊆ M ×M represents some binary relation. “For the space-time structuralist
described in the previous Section, ∀F must range over all and only automorphically in-
variant properties that do not depend in their exemplification on the existence of any
particular individual.” (ibid., our italics).
Surely Wu¨thrich was moving in the correct direction when specifically mentioning
relations as he did, but he failed to reach a correct destination, for relations are permitted
only in so far as they give rise to extrinsic properties. So in the end Wu¨thrich does not take
relations seriously, which is precisely what structuralism does: taking relations seriously,
by acknowledging their capacity to discern (see Section 6), and not taking them only as
auxiliary devices to define properties.
4. Abysmally Embarrassing Consequences. With all these preparations in position,
the argument Wu¨thrich takes from Kera¨nen (2001) against structuralism proceeds quickly.
Let us state precisely what this argument demonstrates:
Proposition 1. Structuralism about cosmic space-times, when taken to include that all
and only automorphic subsets represent properties of space-time points, and the principle
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that automorphically absolutely indiscernible space-time points are identical, is inconsis-
tent.
The premises yield immediately that every automorphic subset P ⊆ M is cosmic. Then
one easily proves for every p, q ∈ Σt that p ∈ P iff q ∈ P . This yields the antecedent of
PIAAI (10), so that p = q.
The implication that Σt contains a single point, Wu¨thrich (2010: 1046) also calls “the
abysmal embarrassment for the space-time structuralist.” We point out that Wu¨thrich’s
argument is not directed against ‘primitive identity facts’, also known as ‘primitive this-
ness’, for otherwise Wu¨thrich’s argument could have been dismissed as a fallacy: the
inference from indiscernibility by properties (or relations for that matter) to identity
(#Σt = 1) would then be fallacious. Proponents of ‘primitive thisness’ have however
taken the adjective ‘primitive’ also as an excuse to throw off the burden of explaining
what these non-qualitative identity facts are; further, an appeal to ‘primitive thisness’ in
order to avoid Wu¨thrich’s abysmal embarrassment is circular when not accompanied by
independent argument.7 Finally, why besmirching GTR with non-qualitative properties
that are physically otiose?
Let us think along Wu¨thrich’s Kera¨nen strategy. We first point out that a corollary of
the proof of Proposition 1 is that Minkowski space-time M (3) only has a single space-time
point, an implication that arguably is even more if not maximally embarrassing. We can
generalise above and beyond GTR to arbitrary sets.
Proposition 2. According to the Principle of the identity of Absolute Indiscernibles,
every set of absolutely indiscernible objects has a single member.
The proof is trivial: if S is a non-empty set of whatever, and Prop(S) is the set of
subsets that represent properties of whatever is in S, and the members of S are absolutely
indiscernible, then by PIAI (8) they are identical. We are left with a single member in S.
For example, a line (E) has a single point. A flat plane (E2) has a single point. Surfaces
of constant curvature, such as a sphere S2(r), have a single point. Euclidean space (E3)
has a single point. We can go on like this, generating embarrassments, but we won’t.
Does the death bell toll for structuralism in mathematics, as Kera¨nen (2001) argued,
and for structuralism about space-time, as one could conclude on the basis of Wu¨thrich
(2010) abysmal embarrassment argument? Or does something go deeply going wrong?
We believe the last-mentioned: diagnosis and cure coming up in the next Sections.
5. Space-Time Structuralism Correctly Characterised. Section 4 has taught us
that what is at stake is not only structuralism but every view that is committed to PIAI
(8). Before we continue, we rehearse some terminology. Adopting the terminology of
7See Wu¨thrich (2010: 1049), who mentions several other authors who have discussed the possibility
of ‘primitive identity facts’ about space-time points.
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Quine, as does Saunders (2003: 293), and of Muller & Saunders (2005: 503–505), call the
members of any set S absolutely indiscernible iff they share all their properties, and rela-
tionally indiscernible iff every member is related to all members of S in the same manner.
Individuals are by definition absolutely discernible; the property that discerns an absolute
discernible is its ‘identity’, its ‘individuality’, if you like; ‘to individuate’ something is to
ascertain it is an individual. Members of S that are absolutely indiscernible but are dis-
cerned by a relation are therefore called relationals. Relationals have no identity and no
individuality, they are neither absolute indiscernibles nor indiscernibles. They constitute
a neglected metaphysical category. Structuralism loves relationals.
Wu¨thrich (2010: 1045) reports that in Max Black’s canonical challenge of PIdIn, of
two black spheres having a diameter of 1mile and being 2miles apart in further empty
3-dimensional Euclidean space (E3), the challenge to PIdIn can be met by means of a
Euclidean invariant distance relation, which discerns the spheres weakly — defined as:
D(p, q) iff dE(p, q) > 0 , (11)
where dE : E
3 × E3 → R+ is the Euclidean distance relation. Wu¨thrich (2010: 1048)
actually considers this ‘Exit Strategy’ but levels an objection against it:
First, it will not be trivial to find such a relation defined on a homogeneous hypersurface
Σt without disturbing its homogeneity if homogeneity is understood as defined in (1).
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Since the Euclidean space (E3) in Black’s canonical case is also homogeneous and
isotropic, why would it be forbidden to use a spatial distance relation in the cosmic
spaces Σt similar to D? Relation D (11) is a Euclidean invariant in that if D(u, v) holds,
and x(u) ∈ E3 and x(v) ∈ E3 are the locations of the centers of the spheres u and v,
then D(T (u), T (v)) also holds for every T ∈ Sym(E3), where Sym(E3) is the Euclidean
symmetry group generated by the spatial displacements and rotations. Cosmic spaces
with constant curvature have no Euclidean metric, but they do have another one, in
terms of which one defines a distance function that discerns points weakly, exactly as in
E
3. So much for Euclidean space.
For the construction of a distance relation based on the metrical tensor g, we refer
to Muller (2011). We shall soon, in the next Section, employ a relation based on the
lightcone structure that will discern space-time points weakly. First we need to provide a
correct characterisation of space-time structuralism.
Let us consider GTR-structures in all their generality. Let G be a GTR-structure
(1), and p, q ∈ M. If g(p) 6= g(q), then g can be used to discern p and q absolutely
from each other.9 But as soon as we have two points having the same g and T , they
8Wu¨thrich’s formula (1) is our (6), so by ‘homogeneity’ he understands by definition that UCP holds.
This is non-standard, unless the properties are restricted to those definable in terms of g, because then
g being everywhere the same implies homogeneity.
9Identity criterion: g(p) = g(q) iff ∃φ ∈ Diff(G), ∃O,O′ ∈ T (M): p ∈ O, q ∈ O′, φ∗g = g on O′, and
φinv∗g = g on O.
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have to be identified due to PIAI (8). This is not what we want. We want to discern
non-identical points by geometrical means provided by the structure G, such that the
discerning relation or property is automorphic. (Notice that to try to discern identical
points is to try to do the logically impossible, because it is to try to refute Leibniz’s
Law — ‘indiscernibility of identicals’, which is a theorem of logic.) Of course, PIdIn
should not be conceived narrowly, as requiring only absolute indiscernibility for identity,
as PIAI (8) does, but requiring, more in the spirit of structuralism, in addition relational
indiscernibility. In the context of GTR, the Principle of the Identity of (Absolute and
Relational) Indiscernibles (PII) for space-time points reads as follows.
First we define relational indiscernibility in GTR-structure G:
RelInd(p, q,M) iff ∀R ∈ Rel(M) :((
∀ r ∈M : 〈p, r〉 ∈ R ←→ 〈q, r〉 ∈ R
)
∧
(
∀ s ∈M : 〈s, p〉 ∈ R ←→ 〈s, q〉 ∈ R
))
,
(12)
where Rel(M) ⊆ P(M×M) is the set of subsets ofM×M that represent genuine rela-
tions between space-time points. Then PII says that two space-time points are identical
if they are absolutely and relationally indiscernible:
(
AbsInd(p, q,M) ∧ RelInd(p, q,M)
)
−→ p = q . (13)
For structuralists, who relish relations and eager to embrace PII, an additional step has
to be made, in order to arrive at a genuinely structuralist PIdIn.
Analogous to definition (5) of an automorphic subset ofM, call a subset R ⊆M×M
to be automorphic in GTR-structure G iff P is invariant under all automorphisms:
∀ψ ∈ Aut(G) : ψ[R] = R . (14)
Let Aut(M×M) be the set of automorphic subsets of M×M (14).
We now define Structuralism with respect GTR (with a capital ‘S’) as a view consisting
of the following four principles.
0. Structural Characterisation of GTR. GTR is characterised through the set of structures
of type G (1).
1. Principle of Automorphic Properties and Relations. For every G, only automorphic
subsets of M represent properties of space-time points and only automorphic subsets
of M×M represent binary relations between space-time points:
Prop(M) ⊆ Aut(M) and Rel(M) ⊆ Aut(M×M) .
2. Principle of the Identity of Automorphic (Absolute and Relational) Indiscernibles (PII?):
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(
AutAbsInd(p, q) ∧ AutRelInd(p, q)
)
−→ p = q ,
where AuRelInd(p, q) is like RelInd(p, q) (12) but replacing ‘Rel(M)’ with ‘Aut(M×
M)’.
3. Structuralist Representation Thesis. If GTR-structure G represents the universe, then
every GTR-structure isomorphic to G (and therefore also every structure automorphic
to G) represents the universe.
We point out that ‘possible worlds’ are not mentioned in these principles. For further
elaboration on these principles, see Muller (2011).
6. Discerning Space-Time Points Structurally. The next relation exploits the
lightcone structure of general relativistic space-times.
Proposition 3. Space-time points in every generally-relativistic space-time are confor-
mally and weakly discernible by a lightcone based relation; therefore absolutely indiscernible
space-time points are relationals.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary GTR-structure G (1). Let LC(p) be the lightcone of p ∈M.
Consider the following lightcone relation, that relates two points iff there is some point
inside one lightcone but outside the other of these points:
L(p, q) iff
(
∃ r ∈M : r ∈ LC(p)\LC(q)
)
∨
(
∃ t ∈M : t ∈ LC(q)\LC(p)
)
. (15)
Then the negation of the lightcone relation L is an identity criterion:
¬L(p, q) ←→ ∀ r ∈M
(
r ∈ LC(p)←→ r ∈ LC(q)
)
←→ p = q , (16)
so that L(p, q), being sufficient and necessary for p 6= q, discerns p and q weakly.
To prove that the metrical relation L (15) is automorphic (14), we must prove that
for every ψ ∈ Aut(G), for every p, q ∈M:
L(p, q) ←→ L
(
ψ(p), ψ(q)
)
. (17)
Well, proposition (17) follows from the following chain of mathematical equivalences:
L(p, q) ←→ p 6= q ←→ ψ(p) 6= ψ(q) ←→ L
(
ψ(p), ψ(q)
)
. (18)
The first and third ‘iff’ follow from the fact that ¬L (15) is an identity criterion for points
in M; the second ‘iff’ from the fact that ψ is a one-one mapping on M. Hence we have
proved something stronger than L being causally invariant, namely that L is permutation
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invariant because invariant under Π(M), and by virtue of (2) then also homeomorphi-
cally, causally, isometrically and automorphically invariant. Q.e.d.
7. Charges of Vicious Circularity. Wu¨thrich has however not been beaten yet,
because the possibility to replace the narrow formulation of PIdIn, which is PIAI (8),
with formulation PII (13), or perhaps even the structuralist formulation PII?, which averts
Wu¨thrich’s abysmal embarrassment, was within Wu¨thrich’s strategic purview (2010: 1048):
Secondly, in order to appeal to such relations, an individuation of objects must already
be presupposed: how can I know there are at least two objects such that an irreflexive
relation can be exemplified on the elements of Σt? I do not see how this suspicion of
circularity can be dispelled.
This charge of vicious circularity is Wu¨thrich’s final attack, aimed at exactly how we have
discerned space-time points on the basis of a correct version of Structuralism. Structural-
ists abysmally embarrassed after all?
Nay nay. Luckily for Structuralism, we see how the suspicion of vicious circularity can
be dispelled, as we shall endeavour to explain next rather succinctly (for an elaboration,
see Muller (2011)).
The aim is not, when we begin with a differentiable manifold of infinitely many distinct
space-time points, to find out whether there really is more than one space-time point —
for that would, indeed, be circular; but the aim is to find out whether the distinctness of
the points can be grounded qualitatively, physically, structurally, and that has not been
assumed tacitly, that can be (and now has been) demonstrated explicitly. We begin, and
must begin, with distinct space-time points. The issue is whether they can be discerned
qualitatively by the means provided by GTR. If they can’t, then PII is in trouble and so
is structuralism; if they can, PII is saved, and if they can be discerned automorphically,
then also PII? is saved, and Structuralism stands tall. This is the issue and it has been
decided by mathematical proof.
Wu¨thrich’s final attack also fails.
8. Conclusion. In summary, Structuralism, as characterised by our four principles,
does not face Wu¨thrich’s abysmal embarrassment and is moreover able to discern space-
time points weakly by means of a physically significant relation that is invariant for the
strongest relevant general symmetry transformations. This relation also discerns all space-
time from each other in the symmetric cosmic space-times which Wu¨thrich advanced to
beat structuralism. No viscious circularities are involved, only deductive demonstrations.
We therefore claim to have defeated Wu¨thrich’s campaign against structuralism.
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